Deconstruction of Leadership Assumptions

Deconstruction of Leadership Assumptions In our rapidly changing world, leaders play a vital role in impacting organizations and the welfare of their followers. Some positive attributes that enhances a successful leader includes initiating new ideas, seeking others opinion and being firm but rigid (Fisher, 1974). Most importantly, leaders who develop the culture of self-awareness towards their subordinates and the organization create an atmosphere of harmony and collaboration.As we take the initiative to deconstruct our leadership assumptions that influenced us personally, our workplaces and academically, we will focus on emotional volatility, withholding information and favoritism. Also, we outlined a revised explanation of these assumptions and a discussion on how these improved us professionally, academically personally.According to Paparone (2004, p.3) a deconstruction is an analysis of statement that has the tendency of demeaning, contradicting or omitting what was originally stated. On the other hand, assumptions are thoughts that emanates from the unconscious or natural (Duplass Ziedler, 2002) used to support in making decisions periodically (Ruggiero, 2004, p.141).Goldman Sachs ProtestsKirby and Goodpaster (2001) said, deconstruction makes us to be conversant of the lack of facts that promotes our behavior. Thus, enabling us to either continue accepting the assumption, provided it is worthy enough to support the truth or reject it to avoid conflicting evidence that affects our judgment (Paparone, 2004).Assumption about emotional volatilitySome of us have undergone a long period of emotional volatility due to loss of family member, war trauma and fragile relationships. Anger leads us into depression, brings about extreme patterns of behavior and thus makes it difficult for us to lead others. The negative aspect of emotional volatility is it muzzles our ability to change. Consequently, once we are noted with the reputation of emotionally volatile we are stigmatized for life.Revised AssumptionsA ccording to Goldman (1995), our intellect cannot work without...

Platos account

Discuss the significance and relevance of Platos account of mimesis and the authenticity of the copy in respect of one of the following films: The Matrix. In your answer pay close attention to both the films form and its content. The Wachowski brothers The Matrix presents a world of illusion, where nothing is as it seems. A world created by computers, run by artificial intelligence. It draws strongly on Platonic theory by showing that only when this fake world is looked at from the outside, from an objective viewpoint, can it be understood, and only when this world of imitation is understood can it be overcome. The work of art in the contemporary world sees allegory, ie. the ability of the story to tell another point for point, as a crucial characteristic. This criteria allows for depth in the work beyond aesthetic, giving art various possible readings and interpretations and allowing the artist/director to retell a story and simultaneously put their own perspective on the tale. The sci-fi epic The Matrix is a prime example of this very post-modern trait. Several allegories are contained within The Matrixs structure and content. The obvious and relevant allegories that of Platos cave. Interestingly, the ancient Greek philosophers cave story was itself an allegory devised by Plato for the degree to which our nature is educated for the state of human existence, or for the plight of man as Plato saw it. The Matrix, in this light, is a copy of a copy. Looking at the movie in regards to its similarities with Platos text. Plato begins by conjuring an image for his audience: people living in an underground place, like a cave. They are restricted in their visions of the world by chains, and they have been there ever since childhood. Similarly, in the Matrix, the human species is being controlled by artificial intelligence. The people are in captivity, and the...

Charles Goodyear Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1750 words

Charles Goodyear - Research Paper Example In truth, his story is an inspirational application of scientific principles to economic reality, with Goodyear’s frequent and often futile attempts to secure capital to apply his ideas to abundance in everyday life. However, only after his death would rubber become an everyday product and a massive industry of production. In 1898, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company took Goodyear’s name in commemoration of his achievement. Thus, even though Goodyear never applied his invention to the mass market as other great inventors did in 19th century America, it is still fair to say that Goodyear lived the American dream of experimenting with science to better mankind. Goodyear was born in New Haven, Connecticut on December 29, 1800 to a well-respected, upper-class family. In 1814, the teenage Goodyear left for Philadelphia to learn about industry; returning in 1821, Goodyear entered into a partnership in his father’s business producing various metal-based products. Three years later, Goodyear married Clarissa Beecher and together they moved to Philadelphia where Goodyear, having left his father’s business, opened a general hardware store. He sold agricultural products imported from England. Within a few years, his business was thriving, and by 1829, he had amassed quite a bit of wealth. In 1829, however, his health declined due to a case of dyspepsia, a disease that attacks the digestive system and causes chronic pain in the upper abdomen. Around this time, his business failed as well; eventually, he was forced to close a number of stores. After his health returned, Goodyear undertook a project that would form the basis of his lifeà ¢â‚¬â„¢s work: the vulcanization process of rubber (Peirce). In 1831, Goodyear began researching gum elastic. He experimented with the best method to make rubber; he produced tubes to show to the Roxbury Rubber

HR management in Britain and in EU Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2500 words

HR management in Britain and in EU - Essay Example The diplomatic management of human resources comes into play during recruitment. It is also responsible for what is contained in employee contracts, and this includes the aspects of social policy, such as social security benefits, leave, responsibility for work injuries, etc. Managers are responsible too for knowing the talents of the members of their workforce, as this knowledge will lead to better deployment. This is to the advantage of production as well as to the advantage of the employees, who achieve a sense of worth and fulfilment in utilising their best skills. Human resource development is also an important part of human resource management, and while the managers in UK firms play a large role in this, in the newer EU countries (Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia) the government takes a much more active role. The European Union has set its own standards for the management of human capital, and these standards must be met by any European state that wishes to enter the union. It realises that "effective management policies lead to employee competence and commitment, congruence between the objectives of employees and management, and is more cost effective" (Price, 2004). Several concerns, however, have been aired. Problems have been foreseen in the area of maintaining quality human resource management across the widening expanse of the European Union. In addition to this, problems also exist where there are discrepancies between and among the HRM policies of different EU member states. Since the European Union allows to some extent for the employment of members across member states, then it is essential for there to exist some level of agreement among the states regarding HRM policies. As it stands, while some states such as the United Kingdom have very advanced policies and robust human re source departments, other states like Slovakia, Poland, and the Czech Republic demonstrate a less developed level of management of its human capital. In order to remove the disparity among EU member states and its candidates, it is necessary first to have a thorough knowledge of the state of affairs in each country and then to compare and contrast to better understand what needs to be done. These nations will be assessed in terms of their managerial structure, managerial policies regarding recruitment, and human resource training and development. The UK model of Human Resource Management The actual term "Human Resource Director/Manager" exists in a large proportion of corporations in the United Kingdom. The existence of such a position demonstrates a high level of commitment to the management of human capital. The HR director overarches other managers who specialise in different areas. In the United Kingdom's private sector, 42% of all firms employing 500-999 persons (smaller firms) have a position with that title. In the larger firms, employing more than 1000 persons, the percentage rises to 65 (Federation of European Employers, 2005). Though not all companies have a position with such a title, there is evidence to suggest that the role does exist. In addition to this, the specialist managers' titles include training director managers,

Augustus de Morgan and George Boole s Contribution to Digital Electronics Essay Example for Free

Augustus de Morgan and George Boole s Contribution to Digital Electronics Essay Augustus De Morgan English mathematician and logician, was born in June 1806, at Madura, in the Madras presidency. His father, Colonel John De Morgan, was employed in the East India Companys service, and his grand father and great-grandfather had served under Warren Hastings. On the mothers side he was descended from JamesDodson,F. R. S. , author of the Anti-logarithmic Canon and other mathematical works of merit, and a friend of Abraham Demoivre. Seven months after the birth of Augustus, Colonel De Morgan brought his wife, daughter and infant son to England, where he left them during a subsequent period of service in India, dying in 1816 on his way home. Augustus De Morgan received his early education in several private schools, and before the age of fourteen years had learned Latin, Greek and some Hebrew, in addition to acquiring much general knowledge. At the age of sixteen years and a half he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, and studied mathematics, partly under the tuition of Sir G.  B. Airy. In 1825 he gained a Trinity scholarship. De Morgans love of wide reading somewhat interfered with his success in the mathematical tripos, in which he took the fourth place in 1827. He was prevented from taking his M. A. degree, or from obtaining a fellowship, by his conscientious objection to signing the theological tests then required from masters of arts and fellows at Cambridge. As a teacher of mathematics De Morgan was unrivalled. He gave instruction in the form of continuous lectures delivered extempore from brief notes. The most prolonged mathematical reasoning, and the most intricate formulae, were given with almost infallible accuracy from the resources of his extraordinary memory. De Morgans writings, however excellent, give little idea of the perspicuity and elegance of his viva voce expositions, which never failed to fix the attention of all who were worthy of hearing him. Many of his pupils have distinguished themselves, and, through Isaac Todhunter and E. J. Routh, he had an important influence on the later Cambridge school. I. n spite, however, of the excellence and extent of his mathematical writings, it is probably as a logical reformer that De Morgan will be best remembered. In this respect he stands alongside of his great contemporaries Sir W. R. Hamilton and George Boole, as one of several independent discoverers of the all-important principle of the quantification of the predicate. Unlike most mathematicians, De Morgan always laid much stress upon the importance of logical training. In his admirable papers upon the modes of teaching arithmetic and geometry, originally published in the Quarterly Journal of Education (reprinted in The Schoolmaster, vol ii. ), he remonstrated against the neglect of logical doctrine. In 1839 he produced a small work called First Notions of Logic, giving what he had found by experience to be much wanted by students commencing with [[Euclid]]. In October 1846 he completed the first of his investigations, in the form of a paper printed in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society (vol. iii. No. 29). In this paper the principle of the quantified predicate was referred to, and there immediately ensued a memorable controversy with Sir W. R. Hamilton regarding the independence of De Morgans discovery, some communications having passed between them in the autumn of 1846. The details of this dispute will be found in the original pamphlets, in the [[Athenaeum]] and in the appendix to De Morgans Formal Logic. Suffice it to say that the independence of De Morgans discovery was subsequently recognized by Hamilton. The eight forms of proposition adopted by De Morgan as the basis of his system partially differ from those which Hamilton derived from the quantified predicate. The general character of De Morgans development of logical forms was wholly peculiar and original on his part. Late in 1847 De Morgan published his principal logical treatise, called Formal Logic, or the Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable. This contains a reprint of the First Notions, an elaborate development of his doctrine of the syllogism, and of the numerical definite syllogism, together with chapters of great interest on probability, induction, old logical terms and fallacies. The severity of the treatise is relieved by characteristic touches of humour, and by quaint anecdotes and allusions furnished from his wide reading and perfect memory. There followed at intervals, in the years 1850, 1858,1860 and 1863, a series of four elaborate memoirs on the Syllogism, printed in volumes ix. nd x. of the Cambridge Philosophical Transactions. These papers taken together constitute a great treatise on logic, in which he substituted improved systems of notation, and developed a new logic of relations, and a new onymatic system of logical expression. In 1860 De Morgan endeavoured to render their contents better known by publishing a [[Syllabus]] of a Proposed System of Logic, from which may be obtained a good idea of his symbolic system, but the more readable and interesting discussions contained in the memoirs are of necessity omitted. The article Logic in the English Cyclopaedia (1860) completes the list of his logical publications. Throughout his logical writings De Morgan was led by the idea that the followers of the two great branches of exact science, logic and mathematics, had made blunders, the logicians in neglecting mathematics, and the mathematicians in neglecting logic. He endeavoured to reconcile them, and in the attempt showed how many errors an acute mathematician could detect in logical writings, and how large a field there was for discovery. But it may be doubted whether De Morgans own system, horrent with mysterious spiculae, as Hamilton aptly described it, is fitted to exhibit the real analogy between quantitative and qualitative reasoning, which is rather to be sought in the logical works of Boole. Perhaps the largest part, in volume, of De Morgans writings remains still to be briefly mentioned; it consists of detached articles contributed to various periodical or composite works. During the years 1833-1843 he contributed very largely to the first edition of the [[Penny]] Cyclopaedia, writing chiefly on mathematics, astronomy, physics and biography. His articles of various length cannot be less in number than 850, and they have been estimated to constitute a sixth part of the whole Cyclopaedia, of which they formed perhaps the most valuable portion. He also wrote biographies of Sir Isaac Newton and Edmund Halley for Knights British Worthies, various notices of scientific men for the [[Gallery]] of Portraits, and for the uncompleted Biographical Dictionary of the Useful Knowledge Society, and at least seven articles in Smiths Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography. Some of De Morgans most interesting and useful minor writings are to be found in the Companions to the British Almanack, to which he contributed without fail one article each year from 1831 up to 1857 inclusive. In these carefully written papers he treats a great variety of topics relating to astronomy, chronology, decimal coinage, life assurance, bibliography and the history of science. Most of them are as valuable now as when written. Among De Morgans miscellaneous writings may be mentioned his Explanation of the Gnomonic Projection of the Sphere, 1836, including a description of the maps of the stars, published by the Useful Know ledge Society; his Treatise on the Globes, Celestial and Terrestrial,1845, and his remarkable [[Book]] of Almanacks (2nd edition, 1871), which contains a series of thirty-five almanacs, so arranged with indices of reference, that the almanac for any year, whether in old style or new, from any epoch, ancient or modern, up to A.  D. 2000, may be found without difficulty, means being added for verifying the almanac and also for discovering the days of new and full moon from 2000 B. c. up to A. D. 2000. De Morgan expressly draws attention to the fact that the plan of this book was that of L. B. Francoeur and J. Ferguson, but the plan was developed by one who was an unrivalled master of all the intricacies of chronology. The two best tables of logarithms, the small five-figure tables of the Useful Knowledge Society 1839 and 1857), and Shroens Seven Figure-Table (5th ed. , 1865), were printed under De Morgans superintendence. Several works edited by him will be found mentioned in the British Museum Catalogue. He made numerous anonymous contributions through a long series of years to the Athenaeum, and to Notes and Queries, and occasionally to The North British Review, Macmillans Magazine, c.  Considerable labour was spent by De Morgan upon the subject of decimal coinage. He was a great advocate of the pound and mil scheme. His evidence on this subject was sought by the Royal Commission, and, besides constantly supporting the Decimal Association in periodical publications, he published several separate pamphlets on the subject. In 1866 his life became clouded by the circumstances which led him to abandon the institution so long the scene of his labours. The refusal of the council to accept the recommendation of the senate, that they should appoint an eminent Unitarian minister to the professorship of logic and mental philosophy, revived all De Morgans sensitiveness on the subject of sectarian freedom; and, though his feelings were doubtless excessive, there is no doubt that gloom was thrown over his life, intensified in 1867 by the loss of his son George Campbell De Morgan, a young man of the highest scientific promise, whose name, as De Morgan expressly wished, will long be connected with the London Mathematical Society, of which he was one of the founders. From this time De Morgan rapidly fell into ill-health, previously almost unknown to him, dying on the 18th of March 1871. An interesting and truthful sketch of his life will be found in the Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society for the 9th of February 1872, vol. xxii. p. 112, written by A. C. Ranyard, who says, He was the kindliest, as well as the most learned of men benignant to every one who approached him, never forgetting the claims which weakness has on strength. De Morgan left no published indications of his opinions on religious questions, in regard to which he was extremely reticent. He seldom or never entered a place of worship, and declared that he could not listen to a sermon, a circumstance perhaps due to the extremely strict religious discipline under which he was brought up. Nevertheless there is reason to believe that he VIII. 1 a was of a deeply religious disposition. Like M. Faraday and Sir I.  Newton he entertained a confident belief in Providence, founded not on any tenuous inference, but on personal feeling. His hope of a future life also was vivid to the last. George Boole George Booles father, John Boole (1779–1848), was a tradesman of limited means, but of studious character and active mind. Being especially interested in mathematical science and logic, the father gave his son his first lessons; but the extraordinary mathematical talents of George Boole did not manifest themselves in early life. At first, his favorite subject was classics. It was not until his successful establishment of a school at Lincoln, its removal to Waddington, and later his appointment in 1849 as the first professor of mathematics of then Queens College, Cork in Ireland (now University College Cork, where the library, underground lecture theatre complex and the Boole Centre for Research in Informatics are named in his honour) that his mathematical skills were fully realized. In 1855 he married Mary Everest (niece of George Everest), who later, as Mrs. Boole, wrote several useful educational works on her husbands principles. To the broader public Boole was known only as the author of numerous abstruse papers on mathematical topics, and of three or four distinct publications that have become standard works. His earliest published paper was the Researches in the theory of analytical transformations, with a special application to the reduction of the general equation of the second order. printed in the Cambridge Mathematical Journal in February 1840 , and it led to a friendship between Boole and D. F. Gregory, the editor of the journal, which lasted until the premature death of the latter in 1844. A long list of Booles memoirs and detached papers, both on logical and mathematical topics, are found in the Catalogue of Scientific Memoirs published by the Royal Society, and in the supplementary volume on Differential Equations, edited by Isaac Todhunter. To the Cambridge Mathematical Journal and its successor, the Cambridge and Dublin Mathematical Journal, Boole contributed twenty-two articles in all. In the third and fourth series of the Philosophical Magazine are found sixteen papers. The Royal Society printed six important memoirs in the Philosophical Transactions, and a few other memoirs are to be found in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and of the Royal Irish Academy, in the Bulletin de lAcademie de St-Petersbourg for 1862 (under the name G Boldt, vol. iv. pp. 198–215), and in Crelles Journal. Also included is a paper on the mathematical basis of logic, published in the Mechanics Magazine in 1848. The works of Boole are thus contained in about fifty scattered articles and a few separate publications. Only two systematic treatises on mathematical subjects were completed by Boole during his lifetime. The well-known Treatise on Differential Equations appeared in 1859, and was followed, the next year, by a Treatise on the Calculus of Finite Differences, designed to serve as a sequel to the former work. These treatises are valuable contributions to the important branches of mathematics in question. To a certain extent these works embody the more important discoveries of their author. In the sixteenth and seventeenth chapters of the Differential Equations we find, for instance, an account of the general symbolic method, the bold and skilful employment of which led to Booles chief discoveries, and of a general method in analysis, originally described in his famous memoir printed in the Philosophical Transactions for 1844. Boole was one of the most eminent of those who perceived that the symbols of operation could be separated from those of quantity and treated as distinct objects of calculation. His principal characteristic was perfect confidence in any result obtained by the treatment of symbols in accordance with their primary laws and conditions, and an almost unrivalled skill and power in tracing out these results. During the last few years of his life Boole was constantly engaged in extending his researches with the object of producing a second edition of his Differential Equations much more complete than the first edition, and part of his last vacation was spent in the libraries of the Royal Society and the British Museum; but this new edition was never completed. Even the manuscripts left at his death were so incomplete that Todhunter, into whose hands they were put, found it impossible to use them in the publication of a second edition of the original treatise, and printed them, in 1865, in a supplementary volume. With the exception of Augustus de Morgan, Boole was probably the first English mathematician since the time of John Wallis who had also written upon logic. His novel views of logical method were due to the same profound confidence in symbolic reasoning to which he had successfully trusted in mathematical investigation. Speculations concerning a calculus of reasoning had at different times occupied Booles thoughts, but it was not till the spring of 1847 that he put his ideas into the pamphlet called Mathematical Analysis of Logic. Boole afterwards regarded this as a hasty and imperfect exposition of his logical system, and he desired that his much larger work, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, on Which are Founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities (1854), should alone be considered as containing a mature statement of his views. Nevertheless, there is a charm of originality about his earlier logical work that is easy to appreciate.

Comparing The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and Tom Sawyer :: comparison compare contrast essays

The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and Tom Sawyer Huckleberry Finn and Tom Sawyer are the best of friends with remarkably different personalities. Each brings their unique characteristics into this comical friendship giving the novel numerous amusing passages. Throughout the tale, Tom is often the leader while Huck is the reluctant follower. It doesn't matter that Tom's ideas are ridiculous and extravagant, and Huck's are simple and practical, together they always proceed with Tom's imaginative plans. In contrast to Tom's great imagination and creativity, Huck is humorless and literal minded. Tom's imaginativeness comes only from knowledge he has gained through books. Huck, on the other hand, actually lives out the fantasies Tom can only imagine. Tom Sawyer, already civilized, follows the values and beliefs of society. Due to these convictions, Tom always abides by the laws. For these reasons, Tom would never have helped free Jim unless he knew that Jim had already been freed. Conversely, Huck Finn rejects the philosophy of political beliefs for the fear of becoming civilized. He usually runs away at the first notion of him becoming "sivilized." Huck is able to function in any society with the help of his adaptability and survival skills. He is able to go from the freedom of the raft, to the perceived harshness of civilization, and back again with ease. Although Tom has been able to slip past Death's grip so far, his chances of escaping may not always work out to his liking. Of the two, Huck will always be the survivor in life. Together this pair achieves their goals because of their intelligence and witty personalities. They have the ability to put the knowledge they obtain into their every day lives. They are two adventurous souls in search of fresh and exhilarating escapades. Their ages united with their exceptional education keeps them on their toes. Huck's humorless personality and Tom's extravagance has made

Miracles and Science Essay

1. Introduction: Miracles as violations of the laws of nature Unbelievable, isn’t it, that there are still students at this university who believe in stories from the Bible, said Martin, an older colleague, at one of the formal dinners around which the traditional life of Oxford University revolves. But Martin, I answered, their faith probably doesn’t differ much from mine. I can still see his face go pale while he nearly choked on his glass of St. Emilion Grand Cru Classà ©: How can you believe in such things nowadays – Walking on water, a resurrection from the dead? Those are miracles, and aren’t you a scientist? Oh, how interesting, say John and Ruth, a couple that I have just met at the end of a church service. You are a scientist. They look a bit unsure of what to say next and John blurts out, I read recently that we still don’t understand how birds can fly so many miles to the south and yet return to exactly the same place each summer. Scientists can’t explain this; it is a miracle, don’t you think? I never quite know what to say next in such conversations. Perhaps nine years of living in Britain have made me too sensitive to that most cardinal of English social sins – causing embarrassment. But there is more to it than that. Behind these statements lies a tangle of complex intellectual issues related to the definition and scope of science, the nature of God’s action in the world, and the reliability and interpretation of the Bible. These have exercised many of greatest minds in history: The debate between atheism and religious belief has gone on for centuries, and just about every aspect of it has been explored to the point where even philosophers seem bored with it. The outcome is stalemate. 1 So says my Oxford colleague Alister McGrath. Although these subtleties are well known to philosophers and historians of  science, public discourse on science and religion often seems blissfully unaware of them. 2 Everyone brings a set of presuppositions to the table. To make progress, these should first be brought out into the open. Without time for an honest conversation in which we can listen to each other in depth, I won’t know exactly what Martin, John, or Ruth’s presuppositions are. But, for the sake of this essay, I will be a bit presumptuous and venture a guess. My guess would be that, although both seem to be on opposite sides of a vast divide, they are in fact influenced by a similar perspective on science and miracles, one first laid down by the great sceptical Scottish philosopher David Hume, who wrote: A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature, and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. This language of â€Å"miracles as violations of the laws of nature† has framed the debate ever since. Martin, John and Ruth, perhaps without realizing it, are living under the long shadow of David Hume. Martin may think that science is the only reliable route to gaining knowledge about the world, and that, since belief in miracles is obviously unscientific, such belief must ipso facto be false. John and Ruth may feel a similar tension between science and miracles, and are therefore encouraged by any natural process that seems inexplicable. Weakening the power of science would seem to strengthen the case for God acting in the world: If we know that today God miraculously steers a bird back to its original habitat after a long return flight to the south, then it is easier to believe that 2000 years ago he turned water into wine at a wedding in Cana. Now, as a Christian scientist who believes in the miracles of the Bible, I take issue with both of the views above. But to explain this better, I need to first take a step back and answer two critical questions: What do I mean by science, and what does  the Bible say about miracles? 2. Defining Science The problem of deciding where to draw the lines around science has vexed generations of philosophers. Like many unsolved issues, it has been given its own name—â€Å"the demarcation problem.† Although one can determine with some degree of consensus what the extremes of the science/non-science continuum are, exactly where the boundary lies is fuzzy. This doesn’t mean, however, that we cannot recognize science when we see it4, but rather that a watertight definition is difficult to create. The old fashioned idea (still taught in many schools) that scientific practice follows a well-defined linear process—first make an observation, then state a hypothesis, and then test that hypothesis—is certainly far too simple. Science as a tapestry Rather than attempt to come up with a careful and precise definition of science or scientific practice, I will instead resort to a favorite metaphor of mine. It originates with one of my former teachers at Cornell, the p hysicist David Mermin, who describes science as a â€Å"tapestry† woven together from many threads (experimental results, interpretations, explanations, etc.).5 It is only when one examines the tapestry as a whole that it will (or will not) make a convincing pattern. Creating scientific tapestries is a collective endeavor building on mutual trust and the communal experience of what kinds of arguments and evidence are likely to stand the test of time. In part because the skill of weaving reliable scientific tapestries relies on subtle judgements, a young scientist may work for years as an apprentice of older and more experienced practitioners before branching out on his own. In this process there are many parallels with the guilds of old. I am fond of this metaphor because it describes what I think I experience from the inside as a scientist. Moreover, it also emphasizes the importance of coherence and consistency when I weave together arguments and data to make an â€Å"inference to a best explanation.†6 The strong communal element inherent in scientific practice has at times been seized upon by sociologists of science to argue that s cientific knowledge is just one more type of human construct with no greater  claim on reality than any other form of knowledge. But scientists as a whole have reacted to this proposition in a negative way.7 Although they agree that all kinds of economic, historical and social factors do play a role in the formation of scientific theories, they would argue that, in the long run, the scientific process does lead to reliable knowledge about the world. The view of nature embraced by most scientists that I know could be described as critical realism. They are realists because they believe that there is a world out there that is independent of our making. The adjective â€Å"critical† is added because they recognize that extracting knowledge about that world is not always straightforward. Thus, the primary role of the collective nature of the scientific process is to provide a network of error-correcting mechanisms that prevent us from fooling ourselves. The continual testing against nature refines and filters out competing scientific theories, leading to advances in the strength and reliability of our scien tific knowledge tapestries. Although there are many commonalities in the ways that scientists in distinct fields assemble their tapestry arguments, there can also be subtle differences. These differences are foisted on us in part by the types of problems that each field attempts to address. For example, as a theoretical physicist I’ve been trained in a tradition of what the Nobel Laureate Eugene Wigner called â€Å"the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics:† The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve. We should be grateful for it and hope that it will remain valid in future research and that it will extend, for better or for worse, to our pleasure, even though perhaps also to our bafflement, to wide branches of learning.8 We believe, based on a history of spectacular success, that mathematical consistency among threads is a key indicator of strong tapestries.9 These days, I spend much of my time interacting with biologists who tend to view my confidence  in the ability of theoretical models to extract knowledge about the physical world with great suspicion.10 I, on the other hand, am often instinctively sceptical of the huge error bars that can afflict their data.11 To a large degree, these cultural differences are forced on us by the kinds of questions we study. My reaction above arises because physics is self-limiting. As a community we simply don’t deal with problems of the same level of complexity that biology does. If an experiment is too messy we will often define it away by declaring â€Å"that isn’t physics,† and move on. Similarly, molecular biologists can afford to be more selective about their data than medical scientists or psychologists can.12 But, despite these cultural differences, which can lead to heated and sometimes frustrating discussion, we do agree on a number of ground rules for defining what makes a tapestry strong. For example, what we either predict or measure should be repeatable. If I claim to see an effect in an experiment, someone else in a different lab should be able to reliably measure the same effect.13 That simple requirement has many ramifications for the types of problems we are able to address The limits of science There are many questions that simply are not amenable to purely scientific analysis. A very lucid discussion of this issue can be found in the book The Limits of Science by Nobel Prize winner (and atheist) Sir Peter Medawar, who wrote: That there is indeed a limit upon science is made very likely by the existence of questions that science cannot answer and that no conceivable advance of science would empower it to answer†¦ It is not to science, therefore but to metaphysics, imaginative literature or religion that we must turn for answers to questions having to do with first and last things. and Science is a great and glorious enterprise – the most successful, I argue, that human beings have ever engaged in. To reproach it for its inability to answer all the questions we should like to put to it is no more sensible than to reproach a railway locomotive for not flying or, in general, not performing any other operation for which it was not designed.14 Science’s great power derives from its self-imposed limits. It is wrong to ask it to pronounce on issues outside its jurisdiction. In fact, the most important decisions in life cannot be addressed solely by the scientific method, nor do people really live as if they can. In the words of Sir John Polkinghorne, former professor of Mathematical Physics at Cambridge and Anglican priest: We are entitled to require a consistency between what people write in their studies and the way in which they live their lives. I submit that no-one lives as if science were enough. Our account of the world must be rich enough – have a thick enough texture and a sufficiently generous rationality – to contain the total spectrum of human meeting with reality. But just because we don’t live life by the scientific method doesn’t mean that the only alternative is irrationality. For example, if I were to decide to get married, a truly irrational approach would be to pick a random woman off the street. Instead, assuming I find a potentially willing partner, it is wise to go through a period of courtship during which we get to know each other. We may also ask for the opinion of wise friends. There are helpful counseling programs with compatibility lists, etc. that, in fact, often use knowledge that scientific techniques have extracted from our collective experience and wisdom. But at the end of the day I can’t demand scientific certainty before deciding to marry someone. Nor is it wise to perform repeatable experiments! I need to make a volitional step because there are aspects of marriage that I can only see from the inside.15 Another example of a method used to obtain knowledge is the legal process which, although it is a tightly organized system, is not strictly scientific. Similarly, a historian will use a combination of evidence (e.g. manuscripts) and understanding about the thinking patterns of a particular era to make informed judgements about what happened in the past. Clearly, this big question of how to extract reliable  information about the world, how to separate fact from mere opinion, is indeed a very difficult and important one. 3. Miracles and the Bible How can we then judge whether or not the miracles of the Bible are reliable? Since the word miracle has taken on so many different meanings, it is important to first examine the biblical language. The New Testament predominantly uses three words for miracle: ï‚ ·teras, a wonder ï‚ ·dunamis, an act of power ï‚ ·semeion, a sign Sometimes it combines all three, as in Acts 2:22: Men of Israel, listen to this: Jesus of Nazareth was a man accredited by God to you by miracles (dunamis), wonders (teras) and signs (semeion), which God did among you through him, as you yourselves know. The word teras (wonder) is almost always used together with one of the other words, emphasizing that the main point of biblical miracles is not to merely elicit amazement but rather to serve a higher theological purpose. For this reason, biblical miracles cannot be understood outside of the theological context within which they occur. They are not anomalous events. This principle provides a key to the proper assessment of their validity. Nature is what God does Miracles happen against a backdrop. In this context, it is illuminating to see how the Bible describes God’s action in the natural world. For example in Psalm 104, that great poem about nature, we read, He makes springs pour water into the ravines, it flows between the mountains The first part of this verse refers to God’s direct action while the second part suggests that water flows through its own natural properties. Read the Psalm for yourself and notice how fluidly the point of view changes back and forth between what we might call the laws of nature and the direct action of God. Such dual descriptions can be found throughout the Bible. The New Testament is even more explicit: The Son is the radiance of God’s glory and the exact representation of his being, sustaining all things by his powerful word. (Hebrews 1:3)  and He is before all things, and in him all th ings hold together (Col 1:17) In other words, if God were to stop sustaining all things by his powerful word, the world would stop existing. That is why, when describing nature, the Bible so easily switches perspectives depending on whether it is emphasizing the regular behavior of natural phenomena, or their origin in God’s providential sustenance. So, as St. Augustine might say, Nature is what [God] does.16 Augustine doesn’t mean that nature is the same as God (pantheism), for, as he also argued, God operates outside of space and time. Nevertheless, and this is a very subtle point, 17 a case can be made for ascribing some independent causal power to the laws of nature. On the other hand, there is no room within a robust biblical theism for the opposite deistic notion that God started the world and then left it to run on its own, completely independently, because descriptions of God’s continuous care for creation are found throughout Scripture: Are not two sparrows sold for a penny? Yet not one of them will fall to the ground apart from the will of your Father. And even the very hairs of your head are all numbered. (Matthew 10:29,30) As Christian thinkers throughout the Middle Ages wrestled with the questions of miracles and God’s action in the world, the following ideas emerged: if the regularities of nature are a manifestation of the sustenance of God then one would expect them to be trustworthy and consistent, rather than capricious. The regular behavior of nature could be viewed as the â€Å"customs of the Creator† as it were. Christians glorify God by studying these â€Å"laws of nature.† A strong case can be made that such theological realizations helped pave the way for the rise of modern science.18 By the time the Royal Society of London, the world’s first scientific society, was founded in 1660, Christian thinkers like the metaphysical poet John Donne, then dean of St. Paul’s Cathedral in London, could write: the ordinary things in Nature, would be greater miracles than the extraordinary, which we  admire most, if they were done but once†¦ only the daily doing takes off the admiration.19 God of the gaps A similar sentiment lies behind a famous exchange between those old adversaries, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Sir Isaac Newton. The latter noticed that the orbits of the planets did not appear to be stable when calculated over long periods, and postulated that the solar system needed occasional â€Å"reformation† by God. Leibniz objected that,  if God had to remedy the defects of His creation, this was surely to demean his craftsmanship. 20 In other words, the regular sustaining activity of God, as evidenced by natural laws, should be sufficient t o explain the regular behaviour of the solar system, without the need for additional ad-hoc interventions. Making it right the first time is more glorious than having to fix it later. In the same context, Leibniz also emphasised the theological nature of miracles: And I hold, that when God works miracles, he does not do it in order to supply the wants of nature, but those of grace. Whoever thinks otherwise, must needs have a very mean notion of the wisdom and power of God.21 A more modern version of Leibniz’s general objection can be found in a famous statement by Charles Coulson, the first Oxford professor of Theoretical Chemistry who wrote, When we come to the scientifically unknown, our correct policy is not to rejoice because we have found God; it is to become better scientists.22 He popularized the phrase â€Å"God of the gaps† for those who, perhaps like John and Ruth, think that God is found primarily in the lacunas of our scientific understanding. Two sorts of miracles Science, as well as tools from historical disciplines, can be brought to bear on biblical miracles. For example they can be split into those that are examples of providential timing (type i miracles) and those that can only be viewed as directly violating physical cause-effect  relationships (type ii miracles). An example of a possible type i miracle would be the crossing of the river Jordan by the people of Israel: Now the Jordan is at flood stage all during harvest. Yet as soon as the priests who carried the ark reached the Jordan and their feet touched the water’s edge, the water from upstream stopped flowing. It piled up in a heap a great distance away, at a town called Adam in the vicinity of Zarethan, while the water flowing down to the Sea of the Arabah (the Salt Sea) was completely cut off. So the people crossed over opposite Jericho. (Joshua 3:15,16) Colin Humphreys, Cambridge professor of material science, has studied this miracle in great detail 23 and notes that the text supplies a number of unusual clues, including the fact that the water was blocked up a great distance away at a particular town. He has identified this with a location where the Jordan has been known to temporarily dam up when strong earthquakes cause mudslides (most recently in 1927). For many scientists, the fact that God is working through natural processes makes the miracle more palatable: The scientist, even when he is a believer, is bound to try as far as possible to reduce miracles to regularities: the believer, even when he is a scientist, discovers miracles in the most familiar things.24 Of course this doesn’t take away from the fact that there was remarkable timing involved. Perhaps the attraction of this description comes in part because there is a direct corollary with the very common experience of â€Å"providential timing† of events, which believers attribute to God’s working.25 There are also miracles in the Bible that defy description in terms of current science. Perhaps the most significant of these is the resurrection of Jesus Christ. If anything, science has strengthened the case for this not being a type i miracle. For example, in John 19:34 we read: Instead, one of the soldiers pierced Jesus’ side with a spear, bringing a sudden flow of blood and water. Modern medicine suggests that this is clear evidence that the pericardium, a membrane around the heart, was pierced, confirming that he was in fact dead. The more we know about the processes of decay that set in after death, the less likely it appears that Jesus could have risen from the dead by any natural means. Rather, science strengthens the case that if Jesus did indeed rise from the dead, the event must have occurred through a direct injection of supernatural power into the web of cause and effect that undergirds our physical world – it was a type ii miracle. Of course the resurrection is central to Christian teaching: And if Christ has not been raised, our preaching is useless and so is your faith. (I Corinthians 15:14) Given that almost every great Christian thinker in history has emphasized the fact that miracles must be understood within the context of a theological purpose, perhaps one could invert this argument and say that it is not surprising that the central eve nt in history would be miraculous. 26 So where has this argument brought us? I have argued that the precise relationship between miracles and science has been the subject of a long and unresolved debate with strands reaching back to the early Church fathers. Theologians wrestle with questions that concern the differences between God’s regular sustaining action and His special non-repeating actions, i.e. miracles, and how these fit in with redemptive purpose. There is a link to the question of demarcation in science, since within a robust biblical theism the regular working of God’s action, the â€Å"customs of the Creator† (or natural laws) are, almost by design, amenable to scientific analysis. Biblical miracles, in contrast, are always linked to special theological purpose and are therefore, almost by definition, non-repeatable and a-scientific. 4. The decisive significance of worldviews If Martin and I would have time to get this far in conversation, I’m sure we would have swiftly passed th e red herring of natural science being the touchstone upon which to examine biblical miracles. But Martin could point out that Hume made a number of other arguments against miracles, namely: Witness testimony is often suspect. ï‚ ·Stories get exaggerated in the retelling. Miracles are chiefly seen among ignorant and barbarous people. ï‚ ·Rival religions also have miracle stories, so they cancel each other out. These arguments are substantial, and I refer to footnote 3 for an introduction to the voluminous literature they have inspired. However, we can take a little stab at the first two objections. It is true that witness testimony cannot always be trusted and that stories change with time. But these are the same problems that face legal systems and historians. Nonetheless, we can employ the tools of these professions to examine biblical miracles. Take, for example, the resurrection of Jesus Christ. There is significant extrabiblical historical evidence that he indeed lived. Much has been written about the general trustworthiness of the Gospels. For example, there is much internal evidence, in both the style and content of the narratives, that the writers themselve s were convinced that Jesus did indeed rise from the dead. Tradition holds that 11 of the 12 original apostles were martyred for this belief that turned a group of cowards into a people who â€Å"turned the world upside down.† Although it is well beyond the scope of this essay, a very strong case for the plausibility of the resurrection can be made.27 Similar analysis can be brought to bear on other miracle claims, including those of other religions. After all, every meaningful system of thought must be open to careful scrutiny. But I suspect that often, underneath the surface, it is really the third argument that carries the most persuasive force. In part because history is littered with claims for the miraculous that seem bizarre, or smack of superstition, and in part because the incredible advances of modern science and technology inspire awe, we can intensely feel the attraction of identifying with the latter and not the former. This disposition is exemplified in the following quote by the theologian Rudolph Bultmann, a man famous for his attempts to de-mythologize the New Testament: It is impossible to use electric light and the wireless and to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries, and at the same time to believe in the New Testament world of spirits and miracles.28 By getting rid of the miracle stories in the Bible,  Bultmann and his followers hoped to make the Christian story more palatable to modern man. Although I recognize the emotional weight of this sentiment, I am not convinced that it is an intellectually coherent approach, mainly for reasons of self-consistency. If the New Testamentitself asserts, both directly and indirectly, that the historicity of the resurrection is foundational to Christianity, then it would seem to stand or fall by that fact. As a physicist, I have a natural penchant for wanting to see how an idea relates to more basic principles. And to analyze the validity of a quote like the one above, we must take a cold hard look at our fundamental presuppositions. In the words of John Polkinghorne: If we are to understand the nature of reality, we have only two possible starting points: either the brute fact of the physical world or the brute fact of a divine will and purpose behind that physical world.29 Where does each of those two fundamental starting points take us? When we use them to construct a worldview, what kind of sense does it make of experience, morality, truth, beauty, and our place in the world? These are not easy questions. There is so much mystery around us. Perhaps the best way to move forward would be to borrow Mermin’s tapestry analogy and carefully investigate whether the different threads of historical evidence, philosophical consistency, and personal knowledge can be woven together into a worldview that is robust. In particular, does our tapestry posses those qualities of coherence and (surprising) fruitfulness that characterise the best scientific tapestries? If I start from the brute facts of nature, I personally am unable to construct a tapestry that is both rigorous and rich enough to make sufficient sense of the world. By contrast, if I assume a divine will and purpose behind the world I believe that I can construct a much more compelling tapesty that incorporates all of the threads of human  existence. Within that purposeful world, the case for Christianity is much more persuasive. To use a famous quote from C.S. Lewis: I believe in Christianity as I believe that the Sun has risen-not only because I see it, but because by it, I see everything else.30 It is the sum total of all those arguments that convinces me of the veracity of biblical miracles. Nevertheless, I recognize that no matter how cogent, say, the historical evidence for the resurrection is, if I start from a different worldview, as Martin and Rudolph Bultmann do, then it will be virtually impossible to accept the existence of biblical miracles. (In the end I think this is what Hume is really saying). Miracles cannot be interpreted independently from the theological context in which they function. They are part of a package deal. I don’t know what Martin would make of all that. We would surely need more than one glass of wine to complete this discussion (but wouldn’t it be fun?). 5. Conclusion Finally, what would I say to John and Ruth? If they are like many Christians I know, they might feel a slight uneasiness with science, a subconscious fear fed by the pontifications of some popularizers who seem keen to equate science with atheism.31 So perhaps I would first point out the obvious limits of science. But then I might tell the story of Leibniz and Newton’s exchange, and point out that Newton was a good enough theologian not to turn the alleged instability of the planets into a God of the gaps argument. Similarly, if it is true that we don’t yet understand how birds can navigate so accurately over large distances, then surely it would bring more glory to God to search for the mechanisms by which such remarkable feats are accomplished: It is the glory of God to conceal a matter; to search out a matter is the glory of kings. Proverbs 25:2 Perhaps because evolution has been a particularly favorite bludgeon of the science = atheism cabal, a Christian mini-industry has sprung up to debunk it. Unfortunately, this only feeds the public misperception that the core of the conflict between science and faith concerns scientific mechanism (evolution did or did not occur) rather than one of the philosophy and interpretation of science. God could, of course, have regularly used miracles to create throughout the time-span of natural history. He is free. But whether he did so in natural history is fundamentally a question of Biblical interpretation. 32 Surely it is even more glorious if God could design a physical system that creates itself through the regularities of his sustaining action. Like many of my Christian scientific colleagues who hold to a high view of Scripture, I believe the biblical text allows itself to be interpreted in this way, that sentient beings arose primarily through the ordinary â€Å"customs of the Creato r,† and that moreover it glorifies God to seek to understand these patterns.33 John and Ruth might then ask: if I emphasize the integrity of the regular action of God in sustaining the universe, and even in creating us, then why should miracles occur at all? Can they occur today? Rather than answer that theological question directly, let me resort to a musical analogy borrowed from Colin Humphreys. Suppose you are watching a pianist play a classical piece. You will notice that there are certain notes that he plays, and certain ones that he never does. The choice of notes is constrained because the music is being played in a particular key signature. But then, occasionally he may break this rule and play an unusual note. Musicians call these accidentals, and a composer can put them in wherever she likes (although if there are too many the music would sound strange). As Humphreys puts it, If he is a great composer, the accidentals will never be used capriciously: they will always make better music. It is the accidentals which contribute to making the piece of music great. The analogy with how God operates is clear: God created and upholds the universe but, like the great composer, he is free to override his own rules. However, if he is a c onsistent God, it must make more sense than less for him to override his rules.34 Notes 1. 2. 3. Alister McGrath, Dawkins’ God: Genes, Memes and the Meaning of Life, (Blackwell, Oxford 2005) p 92. A good example of this is Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, (Bantam, London 2006) David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, (1748). Hume’s argument has often been criticized for being self-referential. He at first presupposes that no reasonable person can believe that the laws of nature can be violated, and then concludes that miracles cannot occur because he defines them as violations of the laws of nature. Note that this analysis is not accepted by all commentators. Colin Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, (Paternoster, Exeter, 1984) provides a lucid overview of the debate. See also John Earman, Hume’s Abject Failure. The Argument against Miracles (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000) for a critical view, and Peter Harrison, â€Å"Miracles, Early Modern Science, and Rational Religion†, Church History 75 (3) pp. 493-511 (2006) for an interesting historical perspective. I am reminded of a famous quote by US Supreme Court judge Potter Stewart who, when asked to distinguish between art and pornography, noted that although it was hard to define: â€Å"I know it when I see it† (Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964)). N. David Mermin, â€Å"The Golemization of Relativity†, Physics Today 49, 11–13 (1996) Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, (Routledge, London, 2004) In the 1990’s this tension between sociologists and the scientific community erupted into the so-called ‘Science Wars’. For a good overview, see e.g. J. A. Labinger and H. Collins (eds), The One Culture? A Conversation about Science, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001). Quote from Nobel Prize winner E. Wigner, â€Å"The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences†, Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics, vol. 13, No. I (February 1960). An iconic example would be Paul Dirac’s 1928 prediction of anti-ma tter, which he showed to be necessary to satisfy the mathematical consistency constraints  imposed by combining quantum mechanics and special relativity for electrons. See P.A.M. Dirac, Proc. Roy. Soc. A, 117, 610 (1928). The cultural differences between more mathematically minded physical scientists and more empirically minded biological scientists are discussed by Evelyn Fox Keller, in a fascinating book: Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development with Models, Metaphors, and Machines, Harvard University Press, Boston (2002). Such instinctive reactions are what make interdisciplinary research so difficult. Clearly biology has been incredibly successful despite its differences with my scientific culture. I also suggest that as the questions we ask become difficult (often the case for applied subjects like medicine), the tapestries, by necessity, become more fragile. I realize that this is more subtle for historical sciences like geology and cosmology (we have, for example, only observed one universe). Nevertheless, even in these fields, parallel concepts apply. P.B. Medawar, The Limits of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1987) . There are interesting analogies here to making a religious commitment. Christians would argue that important aspects of the Christian life can only be understood and experienced from within a relationship with Christ. That is not to say that a step of faith is just a blind leap in the dark. It should be a decision that is informed by careful thinking and weighing of evidence. But it is more than just that. Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis, c AD 391 See e.g. C. J. Collins, Science and Faith: Friends or Foes? (Crossway, Wheaton, 2003) ch 11. See e.g. R. Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise of Modern Science, (Eerdmans, Grand Rapids,1972) John Donne (Eighty Sermons, #22 published in 1640) John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion , CUP, Cambridge (1991), p147. Leibniz, as quoted by C. Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind, (Paternoster, Exeter, 1984), p 75. Charles Coulson, Christianity in an Age of Science, 25th Riddell Memorial Lecture Series, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (1953). Colin Humphreys The Miracles of Exodus: A Scientist’s Discovery of the Extraordinary Natural Causes of the Biblical Stories, (Harper Collins, San Francisco, 2003). R. Hooykaas, op cit One could argue that God must nevertheless employ divine action to set up the conditions necessary for a type i miracle to occur at the right time. In that sense both kinds of miracles may involve violations of normal physical cause-effect relations, but in type i this is more hidden. Note that I am not arguing that miracles  break ultimate cause-effect relationships. Within a divine economy, they may make perfect causal sense. Language like â€Å"violation of physical cause-effect† reflects our limited access to the mind of God.

Inaccessibility: Fiction and Miller

Inaccessibility Brook Thomas in his essay Preserving and Keeping Order by Killing Time in Heart of Darkness extends J. Hills Miller’s â€Å"unveiling† (Miller 220) of Conrad’s narrative. Miller’s essay Heart of Darkness Revisited demonstrates how Heart of Darkness â€Å"belongs to the genre of the parabolic apocalypse† (Miller 217). Thomas responds to Miller’s unveiling â€Å"a lack of decisive unveiling in Heart of darkness† (Miller 220) by reading â€Å"historically the narrative that Conrad weaves† (Thomas 239) so that we might be able â€Å"to come closer to a truth† (Thomas 239).Thomas presents the possibilities of decisive unveiling, which Miller claims, Heart of Darkness lacks. Miller’s questions what makes Heart of Darkness an apocalyptic parable? Subsequently Miller analyzes Conrad’s narrative â€Å"in light of these generic classifications† (Miller 207). Thomas is cautious in interpreting Co nrad’s narrative and questions the possibility of being able to glimpse into an essential truth by placing the text in historical context.Thomas quotes Miller, to synthesise â€Å"Conrad’s fiction in the context of the history of ideas† (Thomas 242), and later on takes up Miller’s suggestion in the evaluation of The Nigger of the â€Å"Narcissus† by Conrad to demonstrate that there can be â€Å"decisive unveiling† (Miller 220). Although Thomas does not mention Miller’s essay Heart of Darkness Revisited he quotes Miller’s The Disappearance of God and Poets of Reality. In addition to Thomas quoting Miller, both critiques adopt similar approaches in their essays.One of the first passage they quote from Heart of Darkness is Marlow informing us â€Å"the meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze, in the likeness of one of these misty hal os that sometimes are made visible by the spectral illumination of moonshine† (Heart of Darkness p. 20) both critiques examine Conrad’s writing and his purpose of writing.Miller’s analysis is that Conrad presents to us the description of â€Å"two kinds of stories: simple tales and parables† (Miller 208) and that Marlow’s stories â€Å"like the meaning of a parable- is outside, not in† (Miller 208) and goes on to say that the parable is inaccessible. Thomas quotes this passage to agree with Miller that â€Å"there is no guarantee that we will penetrate to the essential truth† (Thomas 239) at the same time suggest the possibility to glimpse truth â€Å"if we read historically the narrative that Conrad weaves† (Thomas 239).I am convinced that Thomas complicates Millers argument. Miller quotes Marx to define a parable like â€Å"the use of real life condition to express another reality or truth not otherwise expressible† he then compares the parable used from the Bible to demonstrate how Conrad’s fiction functions as a parable. Miller proves Heart of Darkness to be a parabolic apocalypse.In reference to the earlier passage from Heart of Darkness of the haze, Miller compares the image of the haze and illumination Conrad creates, with the â€Å"case of Jesus’ parable of the sower† (Miller 210) as Conrad uses â€Å"realistic and almost universally known facts as the means of expressing indirectly another truth less visible† (Miller 210). Miller further explains that Conrad’s parable becomes not just a way to examine Marlow’s story, consequently to examine Conrad’s narrative itself.Miller quotes Wallace Stevens that â€Å"there is no such thing as a metaphor of a metaphor† and moves on to use the Bible and Conrad’s The Nigger if the â€Å"Narcissus† to demonstrate inaccessibility of Heart of Darkness. Using the parable of the sower Mille r explains: â€Å"If you understand the parable you do not need it. If you need it you cannot possibly understand it† (Miller 210). Likewise Heart of Darkness based on the facts of History and Conrad’s life is used to express â€Å"the evasive and elusive truth underlying both historical and personal experience† (Miller 210) being a parable would fail to illuminate one who does not see the darkness.Miller picks out the passage of Marlow’s narration of life sensation and the impossibility of communicating life sensation sets it against the image of the halo in the mist to show us that Heart of Darkness â€Å"is a revelation of the impossibility of revelation† (Miller 212). The Nigger of the â€Å"Narcisusus† is used by both critiques to examine Conrad’s purpose of writing but interpretations of both critiques differ. They both quote similar passage of Conrad proclaiming his attempt to make his readers see and â€Å"that glimpse of tru th for which you have forgotten to ask†.Miller picks out the â€Å"double paradox† of seeing darkness in terms of light and the two sense of see one as physical vision and second the unveiling the invisible truth. Like the parable of the sower Miller states the Heart of Darkness does not accomplish in makes the reader glimpse truth. This analysis differs from Thomas analysis of the same quotation from The Nigger of the â€Å"Narcisusus†. Firstly Thomas uses this quotation to synthesis Conrad’s narrative and history, that Conrad re-envisions the way ineteenth-century historians that to â€Å"discover truth we had forgotten was to reconstruct it historically† (Thomas 248) linking the reading of the narrative with historical context. Secondly Thomas quotes The Nigger of the â€Å"Narcisusus† where â€Å"Conrad explicitly compares his work as an artist to the work of civilization† (Thomas 254) here Thomas links reading Heart of Darkness fo r the Conrad’s writing and focus on work. While Miller narrows the reading of Heart of Darkness and the inaccessibility of the narrative, Thomas points various ways to allow the narrative to be accessible.Miller examines the similarity between a parable and apocalypse genre through the notion that both â€Å"is an act of unveiling† (Miller 207). Again Miller uses the Bible to demonstrate how Heart of Darkness follows the genre of the apocalypse. Miller compares Conrad’s narrative structure of how the â€Å"reader of Heart of Darkness learns through the relation of the primary narrator, who learned through Marlow, who learned through Kurtz† (Miller 214) to â€Å"the book of Revaltion, God speaks through Jesus, who speaks through a messenger angle, who speaks through John of Patmos, who speaks to us† (Miller 214).This speaking through one next farther is what characterizers Heart of Darkness as the genre of the apocalypse. Miller synthesis of Heart o f Darkness as a parabolic apocalypse is what leads to his conclusion to the lack of decisive unveiling in the novel. The â€Å"ventriloquism† (Miller 214) of having a voice behind a voice and deprives the novel a voice of authority. Miller proves how the novel fits in the generic classification and identify the writing of Conrad to unveil as deeper truth but points out that the problems of the parable and apocalypse in making the Heart of Darkness inaccessible.Thomas acknowledges this inaccessibility but presents us with possible accessible reading through the synthesises he suggests. Thomas quotes Conrad’s Notes on Life and Letters and follows through Conrad’s stand that â€Å"fiction is history† and by placing Heart of Darkness in the context of history we can attempt to glimpse a truth. Thomas presents that Conrad weaves a story that â€Å"that proves to be truer that history† (Thomas 242). Thomas introduces British modernist novelist James Joyc e, D.H Lawrence, Virginia Woolf and E. M. Foster linking them with the â€Å"Jacques Lacan’s revision of Hegel† (Thomas 243) and some recent critiques concept of â€Å"the other†. By using the modern novelist to illustrate encounter between east and west Thomas synthesises Heart of Darkness as an encounter of Europe’s another with the other within itself. Thomas goes on to demystify the Eurocentric history and draws on modern thinkers Friedrich Nietzsche for poststructuralist thought and Sigmund Freud for psychoanalysis.Thomas states â€Å"for critics like Miller trying to cope with the loss of confidence in the Eurocentric view that is dramatized by Conrad’s narrative† (Thomas 244) but Thomas asserts that Conrad’s narrative help identify the condition for poststructuralist thought. And Freud as Thomas states â€Å"Conrad’s narrative [of] Africa eludes all attempts of the Western mind-especially a male mind – to underst and it†. However Thomas points out the problem of simply accepting this reading denying the encounter with â€Å"the other† the non – European, if it is reduced to a function of understanding Europe.Thomas goes back to close read and from the novel and looks at The Nigger of the â€Å"Narcisusus† to examine Conrad’s purpose. How Thomas moves beyond Miller in his analysis is by examining the â€Å"breaks and gaps† (Thomas 251) within the narrative. Miller almost alludes to the encounter of the other within Europe â€Å" the end of the Western civilization, or of Western imperialism, the reversal of idealism into savagery† (Miller 218) but goes on to show that the ironies in Marlow’s narrative is impossible to read with a clear meaning.Miller begins with Marx by using his definition of parable conversely Thomas ends with Marx in examining work and how it is â€Å"work, then, that constructs the lie of civilization† (Thomas 255). Thomas refers back to Conrad’s The Nigger of the â€Å"Narcisusus† examines a passage and draws Miller into the discussion pointing to the task of the writer to be a workman of art to provide a glimpse of truth to the man caught in labour. Work then links with Conrad’s narrative and the breaks and gaps from which Thomas suggests to draw a definitive unveiling.Thomas ends with a more radical envisioning one which allows â€Å"the other† to be represented not one suppressed in an understanding of Europe while Miller ends that his analysis of the novel has made his a witness pushing the truth further away as he adds on to the voices. As compelling as Miller’s close reading and comparison with the Bible, Thomas's extension of Miller’s discussions makes Thomas argument more convincing as he presents an additional step of not just looking into Conrad’s narrative but also the breaks in it.Reference Miller, J. Hillis. â€Å"Heart of Da rkness Revisited. † In Conrad Revisited: Essays for the Eighties, edited by Ross C. Murfin, pp. 31-50. University: The University of Alabama Press, 1985. Thomas, Brook â€Å"Preserving and Keeping Order by Killing Time in Heart of Darkness. † In Conrad Revisited: Essays for the Eighties, edited by Ross C. Murfin, pp. 31-50. University: The University of Alabama Press, 1985.

The Ghost in Shakespeares Hamlet essays

The Ghost in Shakespeares Hamlet essays The ghost of William Shakespeares play, Hamlet, has a clear mission. He knows that the kings death must be avenged, he knows that Hamlet must do it, and he is very clear about how it should be done. The ghost knows that he must first convince Hamlet that he is who he says he is, and then he must convince Hamlet to avenge his death. His concerns are related primarily to Gertrude and Claudius but he also thinks that all of Denmark should be aware of the terrible deed that has been done. The ghost of Hamlet has a strong sense of self and he is very aware of the immediate surrounding as well as the bigger picture. He also has a plan and Hamlet is the only person that can carry out the plan. The ghost in Hamlet is one that exhibits extreme self-control throughout the entire play. We can see an example of this when the ghost and Hamlet talk at the end of Act I. The ghost is very well aware of who he is, although Hamlet expresses much doubt about his identity. When the ghost tells Hamlet that he is thy fathers spirit (Shakespeare I.v.14), we believe him because his character is strong. He is also aware of the fact that he is a ghost: Doomed for a certain term to walk the night And for the day confined to fast in fires Till the foul crimes done in my day of nature Here we see how the ghost is not only aware of the fact that he is a ghost but he knows why. He knows that he cannot tell the secrets of his house but if he could, they would freeze Hamlets blood. The ghost is also aware of Hamlets place in all of this. It is simply to avenge his fathers death, a foul and most unnatural murder (I.v.31). It is also important to note how the ghost is able to see the bigger picture. He wants Hamlet to know that he was not just murdered but he was murdered in a foul way by those closest to him. He tells Hamlet that because of how he died ...

The Value of Believing You Get What You Pay For

The Value of Believing You Get What You Pay For Choosing Value Last week I received a call from a marketing executive in Switzerland who wanted assistance with an important cover letter. He had found me on LinkedIn and chosen my company over three others. With excitement in his voice, he explained to me that as a marketer, he was fascinated by his own behavior in deciding upon The Essay Expert: He chose us because we were the most expensive company. In a similar phenomenon, for many months I had been frustrated that people were landing on my professional bio page and calling me about the service, but not purchasing. I considered removing bios from my offerings, but first decided to try raising my rates. Lo and behold, people started buying bios more often! I got the sense that they trusted they would get a better product and perhaps something they couldn’t write themselves. Of course, people do not always choose to buy the most expensive option in front of them. Different consumers have different budgets, and some people simply can’t afford to purchase more pricey goods and services. In fact, the same week I was contacted by the client from Switzerland, I also heard from a client who wanted to pay $500 for services that would normally go for $1700 according to my normal pricing. He simply could not afford my rates. And although I sympathized with his situation, I was not able to work with him and keep within my business model. Pricing Psychology If it’s true that â€Å"you get what you pay for,† expectations are set by price, and regardless of the actual product or service delivered, a consumer will value it according to what he or she paid for it. Studies have shown that people expect a positive correlation between price and quality (e.g., Rao and Monroe, 1989). In a 2008 study about wine enjoyment by Goldstein et. al., consumers who did not know the price of the wine they were drinking did not like more expensive wine better; but when they were told they were drinking a more expensive wine, they gave the wine higher ratings. It seems our brains actually play tricks on us to make us appreciate things more when we pay more money for them! This doesn’t mean that we can charge high prices and then deliver a shoddy result. If someone pays a high price for something and is disappointed, she might be even more upset than if she had paid less- although not necessarily! I have learned that people looking for a deal are often more demanding than those willing to pay for value. Choosing Clients My Swiss client was clearly guided by the phenomenon of expecting value for value. And he knew the value he wanted: the confidence that would come from having a clearly written, persuasive letter, in solid English, stating his commitment and qualifications for transitioning from the corporate to the non-profit world. He was my ideal client. He requested to pay a rush fee for a quick turnaround. He partnered with us fully in the project. And when we delivered the letter, he told us we had exceeded his expectations. In return, I was happy and willing to go the extra mile for him and give him the modifications he needed at 11pm U.S. Central time on a Friday night. He has already purchased additional services. The price-averse potential client, on the other hand, was not my ideal client. He presented with a complex situation that would have required more work than the average executive service, yet even at $1700 he would have been paying mid-level rates. Having been out of work for a year, I believe he was looking for a result that I could not guarantee: a job. For him, I believe confidence in putting his best foot forward might not have been enough, and I was concerned that he might come back asking for a refund of his $500. Every business owner when setting pricing must make a decision about what type of clients they want to target: Do you want those who are looking for a deal and will say yes because you offer one? Or those who want to pay for value and will appreciate your products and services in part because they paid top dollar for them? There is no right answer to which type of client to attract, but for me, I choose the latter. That’s my win-win and I am prepared to live up to my value proposition.

Corporate Strategy of Record Label Term Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 3000 words - 1

Corporate Strategy of Record Label - Term Paper Example The labels are demanding a revolution from their trade unions and they have dropped DRM to keep up with the changes in the contemporary world by engaging in innovative operations. The competition among the key players in this industry is not as aggressive as in other industries. Sony record label is a renowned company in the entertainment industry offering diverse products and services to its wide market as explained by Hanson et al. (2001). Their productions are highly refreshing and entertaining (Sony United 2007). This is achieved by efficiently combining and managing its resources, competencies, and abilities. This results in a strong competitive advantage. Resources are the features owned and managed by a company to create value for customers as stipulated by Hill et al. (2007). The discussion below analyses the different resources owned and managed by the company. These are described as the tangible resources that have physical properties and are financial in nature (Hill et al. 2007). The company recorded an increase in sales of 10% in the year 2007 (Sony United 2007). The company owns other forms of tangible resources in form of land, buildings, machinery, and equipment valued at nearly 14 million dollars (Sony United 2007). Recent consolidated financial statements how that the company’s annual sales had increased to 78 billion dollars as at 31st March 2010 (Sony Corporation of America 2011). The company has a variety of assets that form a substantial part of the financial assets that have been increasing over the years. The company has intangible resources that have prospective benefits as stated by Hill et al. (2007). The company is linked to quality and is among the top enterprises globally. This reputation has led to increased sales over the years (Singh et. al. 2005). The company’s brand is recognized worldwide and it is among the most trusted music labels.

A Great Deal of Stress Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1750 words - 2

A Great Deal of Stress - Essay Example I recently uncovered that one of our members was selling these very same exams via the school website to people outside of the BSP community. The fact that people outside of our program were receiving these past examination papers did not bother me much. What really disturbed me was that the culprit was profiting from a resource that is normally free. It was a difficult decision to make because I was personally close to the person doing this. I was in a dilemma – I also wanted to protect the integrity of the program along with all of its benefits. I could not even seek help from others. It was a question of making a value-driven decision, which potentially puts our friendship at stake. However tough it may have been, I finally chose to go by what my conscience told me. I brought it to the attention of the Director and the Assistant Directors. Appropriate disciplinary action was taken and there were no major implications to the program and the organization. If I had to deal with a similar circumstance in the future, I would still have made the same choice, of abiding by the principles and values that I have earned through my upbringing. While it may be easy to decide, on the contrary, it will be strongly against my core values and principles. And since I have always lived by and made principle-driven decisions, I have not felt regret or resentment having made such a decision, because I am aware that with all conscience, I am doing what I ought to do.